Mead’s views may seem an outlier to the readership of this Substack, but having followed the recent editorial judgements of the WaPo, NYT, and, of course, the WSJ, I can state he is on track with our foreign policy elite. Call it nuts or simply criminal contempt of the country’s real needs, these folks are seriously determined to advance US hegemony, even at the risk of a major war.
Additionally, they are seriously out of touch with the capabilities of our current military. The US armed forces haven’t experienced combat with a first class military since WWII. Russia can field modern air combat and missile forces, modern heavy armor and artillery, likely the world’s best air defenses, along with fully resourced logistics, and—in Ukraine—extremely short supply lines. Even with NATO’s backing—a big if—this would not be a fair fight. You’d think Biden’s ‘brain trust’ would understand this but I’m convinced they don’t.
1. Although the United States has blundered into a series of foreign policy disasters, nobody in the foreign policy establishment has suffered as a result of those blunders, neither personally nor professionally. The only people who have suffered were the people who called for restraint, even as the wars turned out worse than the most pessimistic naysayers predicted.
2. The foreign policy establishment may be living in a weird dreamland bubble, but even they are aware that America is an empire in decline. What that means is that America's "unipolar moment" is fading fast, so if there are wars of aggression that they wish to start, now may be the last chance to start them.
The difference this time is that, unlike Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Yemen, etc., Russia is an enemy that is actually capable of shooting back.
3. Much like in 1914, there is an overwhelming concern for Muh American Credibility. This is in part because as America declines, the last thing Washington can tolerate is for its vassals, satraps, proxies, cutouts, puppets, etc. to start to get ideas.
Moreover, back in Washington, Team R and Team D alike are more interested in scoring points at the other team's expense than they are in furthering national goals. Accusing the other team of cowardice or weakness is an easy way to score those points. The problem is that this means that aggression can ever always only be dialed up, never down.
4. A jolly little foreign war is just the thing to get the masses to rally 'round the flag one more time. What could possibly go wrong? This is also just like 1914.
Not long ago, I went to a panel event where a military commander was one of the speakers. It was reflections on the war on terrorism. This commander said “I don’t think I’m giving this audience any classified information when I say that decades of focusing on counterterrorism have left our ability to fight conventional ground wars deeply degraded, and we now have serious preparedness problems.” He said this in reference to a question about the US potentially defending Taiwan in the event of China attempting to “forcefully reunify.”
Mead’s views may seem an outlier to the readership of this Substack, but having followed the recent editorial judgements of the WaPo, NYT, and, of course, the WSJ, I can state he is on track with our foreign policy elite. Call it nuts or simply criminal contempt of the country’s real needs, these folks are seriously determined to advance US hegemony, even at the risk of a major war.
Additionally, they are seriously out of touch with the capabilities of our current military. The US armed forces haven’t experienced combat with a first class military since WWII. Russia can field modern air combat and missile forces, modern heavy armor and artillery, likely the world’s best air defenses, along with fully resourced logistics, and—in Ukraine—extremely short supply lines. Even with NATO’s backing—a big if—this would not be a fair fight. You’d think Biden’s ‘brain trust’ would understand this but I’m convinced they don’t.
I suspect that several things are at play here:
1. Although the United States has blundered into a series of foreign policy disasters, nobody in the foreign policy establishment has suffered as a result of those blunders, neither personally nor professionally. The only people who have suffered were the people who called for restraint, even as the wars turned out worse than the most pessimistic naysayers predicted.
2. The foreign policy establishment may be living in a weird dreamland bubble, but even they are aware that America is an empire in decline. What that means is that America's "unipolar moment" is fading fast, so if there are wars of aggression that they wish to start, now may be the last chance to start them.
The difference this time is that, unlike Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Yemen, etc., Russia is an enemy that is actually capable of shooting back.
3. Much like in 1914, there is an overwhelming concern for Muh American Credibility. This is in part because as America declines, the last thing Washington can tolerate is for its vassals, satraps, proxies, cutouts, puppets, etc. to start to get ideas.
Moreover, back in Washington, Team R and Team D alike are more interested in scoring points at the other team's expense than they are in furthering national goals. Accusing the other team of cowardice or weakness is an easy way to score those points. The problem is that this means that aggression can ever always only be dialed up, never down.
4. A jolly little foreign war is just the thing to get the masses to rally 'round the flag one more time. What could possibly go wrong? This is also just like 1914.
Great comment.
The Finster aims to please.
Not long ago, I went to a panel event where a military commander was one of the speakers. It was reflections on the war on terrorism. This commander said “I don’t think I’m giving this audience any classified information when I say that decades of focusing on counterterrorism have left our ability to fight conventional ground wars deeply degraded, and we now have serious preparedness problems.” He said this in reference to a question about the US potentially defending Taiwan in the event of China attempting to “forcefully reunify.”
Nothing that a few trillion more won't fix
Axtually, pretty much every wargame scenario going back for ten or more years indicates that NATO would lose a conventional war in Ukraine.
So, my chickenhawk neocon tough guys, are you ready to take a nuke for the Nazis of Galicia?