If the Haasses of this country had enough integrity to even entertain a thought other than their own, they would benefit greatly from the view from the Larison side of the diplomatic isle. Earlier this week, Aaron Maté interviewed Maj. Danny Sjursen and Mathew Hoh. Major Danny's account of the payroll he routinely administered on our government's behalf was so indicative of the problem we falsely claimed we were addressing and laughable at the same time. Well worth a listen... https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_bo7P_podIk
There’s a lot of the “but Japan, Korea, and Germany!” arguments going around in attempting to make the case against withdrawal and I think those are worth engaging head on.
Of course, we didn’t put troops in Germany to fight the Germans but as a deterrent against a large-scale invasion by Soviet Union, who might otherwise see an undefended Berlin and West Germany as a tempting target for invasion. The Eisenhower doctrine—as formulated as his critique of Truman’s handling of Korea—employed a similar line of thinking. Of course, aerial bombing campaigns from 51-53 wiped out 1-2 million North Koreans (10-20% of the population, by Gen. LeMay’s estimates, out of a 1950 population of 10 million) which—setting aside the grave moral calculus there—was also aimed at preventing a post-civil war North Korea from being able to field and launch an army for a mass-invasion for decades. That’s what those massive troop installations were designed to do. As time went on, a lot of the inertia for withdrawing those troops becomes economic and political. There’s pressure to remove the naval base out of Okinawa due to crime of conflicts with locals, for example, but that gets countered by the local business establishment which has grown dependent on their patronage. It absolutely is a discussion to have about bringing those troops home as well.
Compare that with modern Islamist insurgencies in the Middle East, in which case it is precisely the presence of foreign armies and the perception of western imperialism that motivates them to attack and attract recruits. Yes, Al Qaeda attacked America on 9/11 and Osama Bin Ladin’s manifesto in the NY Times outlined a dog’s breakfast of grievances, but the proximate one seems to have been his view on the illegitimacy of the Saudi government that could only hold power due to the backing of US forces. His attack on the US—the “head of the snake”—was not because he hated our freedoms. They want us out, we want us out—maybe this doesn’t have to be such a difficult decision.
Haas' attempt to distinguish between "occupation" and "presence" is a great illustration of how the Blob uses a mixture of circular reasoning and PR-firm vetted language to defy logic and common sense.
First, Haas is probably aware that a great many locals in South Korea, Japan, and Germany would like the American military bases *out* at this point. There was a period of time where they were accepted as a means of deterring potential invasions from China/the USSR and the locals preferred a deterrent across the ocean to the 800-pound gorilla next door, but those days are gone. Every year, American servicemen commit idiotic and often egregious crimes and other acts of misbehavior that greatly anger the people who live next to these overseas bases. Haas is surely aware of this.
"Ah," Haas would reply, "but we are there with the consent of the host governments, so it's OK." As Daniel points out, this argument is especially circuitous with Afghanistan because *we were the ones who put the government we recognized in power in the first place.* A country has a government that doesn't want an American military base, eh? Well, let's just knock 'em off and install a friendly government that will consent to a military base in their place!
It's not like it would really matter if we didn't have the consent of the host government. Cuba has wanted the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base gone ever since 1959 but we haven't complied.
If the Haasses of this country had enough integrity to even entertain a thought other than their own, they would benefit greatly from the view from the Larison side of the diplomatic isle. Earlier this week, Aaron Maté interviewed Maj. Danny Sjursen and Mathew Hoh. Major Danny's account of the payroll he routinely administered on our government's behalf was so indicative of the problem we falsely claimed we were addressing and laughable at the same time. Well worth a listen... https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_bo7P_podIk
There’s a lot of the “but Japan, Korea, and Germany!” arguments going around in attempting to make the case against withdrawal and I think those are worth engaging head on.
Of course, we didn’t put troops in Germany to fight the Germans but as a deterrent against a large-scale invasion by Soviet Union, who might otherwise see an undefended Berlin and West Germany as a tempting target for invasion. The Eisenhower doctrine—as formulated as his critique of Truman’s handling of Korea—employed a similar line of thinking. Of course, aerial bombing campaigns from 51-53 wiped out 1-2 million North Koreans (10-20% of the population, by Gen. LeMay’s estimates, out of a 1950 population of 10 million) which—setting aside the grave moral calculus there—was also aimed at preventing a post-civil war North Korea from being able to field and launch an army for a mass-invasion for decades. That’s what those massive troop installations were designed to do. As time went on, a lot of the inertia for withdrawing those troops becomes economic and political. There’s pressure to remove the naval base out of Okinawa due to crime of conflicts with locals, for example, but that gets countered by the local business establishment which has grown dependent on their patronage. It absolutely is a discussion to have about bringing those troops home as well.
Compare that with modern Islamist insurgencies in the Middle East, in which case it is precisely the presence of foreign armies and the perception of western imperialism that motivates them to attack and attract recruits. Yes, Al Qaeda attacked America on 9/11 and Osama Bin Ladin’s manifesto in the NY Times outlined a dog’s breakfast of grievances, but the proximate one seems to have been his view on the illegitimacy of the Saudi government that could only hold power due to the backing of US forces. His attack on the US—the “head of the snake”—was not because he hated our freedoms. They want us out, we want us out—maybe this doesn’t have to be such a difficult decision.
Does Foreign Policy allow comments these days? This needs to be cut and pasted.
Haas' attempt to distinguish between "occupation" and "presence" is a great illustration of how the Blob uses a mixture of circular reasoning and PR-firm vetted language to defy logic and common sense.
First, Haas is probably aware that a great many locals in South Korea, Japan, and Germany would like the American military bases *out* at this point. There was a period of time where they were accepted as a means of deterring potential invasions from China/the USSR and the locals preferred a deterrent across the ocean to the 800-pound gorilla next door, but those days are gone. Every year, American servicemen commit idiotic and often egregious crimes and other acts of misbehavior that greatly anger the people who live next to these overseas bases. Haas is surely aware of this.
"Ah," Haas would reply, "but we are there with the consent of the host governments, so it's OK." As Daniel points out, this argument is especially circuitous with Afghanistan because *we were the ones who put the government we recognized in power in the first place.* A country has a government that doesn't want an American military base, eh? Well, let's just knock 'em off and install a friendly government that will consent to a military base in their place!
It's not like it would really matter if we didn't have the consent of the host government. Cuba has wanted the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base gone ever since 1959 but we haven't complied.
Even forgetting the Doha Accord, the Portuguese were losing fewer and fewer men in the Ultramarine Wars as the security situation deteriorated.
That's because they were rarely leaving their fortified bases, so as not to take casualties.