As it relates to Taiwan, I am increasingly concerned by what I am going to call the "deterrence-credibility trap." Hawks say we need to make an explicit security commitment to Taiwan because such a commitment would "deter" China from invading the island. Assume that China invades/blockades Taiwan despite that explicit security commitment. Now, we would be trapped into getting into a war with China over Taiwan. In this scenario, even though the security guarantee obviously did not have its intended effect of "deterring" China, the Hawks would nevertheless say we needed to honor it in order to "preserve our credibility."
In other words, the trap consists of making a commitment so that you don't have to honor due to "deterrence" and then having to honor it to "preserve credibility."
If Muh Credibility is such a concern, maybe we should stop letting our mouth write checks that our @ss can't cash?
As it relates to Taiwan, I am increasingly concerned by what I am going to call the "deterrence-credibility trap." Hawks say we need to make an explicit security commitment to Taiwan because such a commitment would "deter" China from invading the island. Assume that China invades/blockades Taiwan despite that explicit security commitment. Now, we would be trapped into getting into a war with China over Taiwan. In this scenario, even though the security guarantee obviously did not have its intended effect of "deterring" China, the Hawks would nevertheless say we needed to honor it in order to "preserve our credibility."
In other words, the trap consists of making a commitment so that you don't have to honor due to "deterrence" and then having to honor it to "preserve credibility."