A very fine piece. I will grant (purely for the sake of argument) that conflict with China is inevitable. I applaud the author for realizing that if conflict with China is inevitable, it would make unquestionable strategic sense to have Russia as a key member of the counter-balancing coalition. I laud him for not advocating the worst option of all: a disastrous "dual containment" strategy vis-a-vis both China and Russia simultaneously. There may be no such thing as a "natural" partner or enemy in international relations but Russia and China share an awfully long land border, and proximity tends to breed conflict. The author has a plausible objective in trying to bring Russia into the American-led counterbalancing coalition against China (albeit an objective based on the premise that conflict with China is inevitable, which I do not believe.)
The problem lies in the fact that the author seems to have failed to appreciate the most basic aspect of how to achieve that objective: in any negotiation, you have to give something up in order to get something back. When I go to buy a car, I would like the dealer to give me a new car for free. The dealer would like me to pay a million dollars for a new Kia. Neither are going to happen, and we negotiate and meet in the middle. I expect that the dealer may be willing to give some things up in the course of a negotiation, but I do not expect that he will do me any gratuitous favors. Forming a closer relationship with a foreign state is much more complex but follows the same principle: states are not in the business of doing gratuitous favors. Kupchan seems to think that Russia will side with the US in a great power conflict with a nuclear state on its border in exchange for a "change in tone." That would be about as reasonable as me expecting to buy a new car for $1,000. It ain't nothing and it's a start, but any reasonable negotiator would know that it's far below his counterpart's reservation price based simply on common sense.
Instead, we might do a better job of persuading Russia if we understood Russia's core security interests and were willing to make concessions which addressed those interests. Russia's overwhelming #1 security interest lies in keeping Georgia and Ukraine out of NATO. If we offered that concession (which would simply be in keeping with James Bakers' 1991 promise to Gorbachev that NATO would not expand "one inch to the east" of a reunified Germany) it would do wonders. Convincing Russia that we would keep this promise is another matter, and I am not sure they could be convinced that we would honor this agreement, or that a future administration wouldn't simply reverse this policy. But it would be a way to completely reverse the crash in US-Russia relations that has taken place ever since Hillary Clinton decided that Russia rather than her own lack of electoral appeal was the reason she lost to a semi-literate clown in 2016.
Frankly this wouldn't be a horrible concussion on our part either. Simply put, while Ukrainian NATO membership is a core Russian security interest, it does not matter to us in any material sense whatsoever. Readers of this blog are no doubt familiar with the flaws and hypocrisy that animate the "it's a matter of sacred principle!" arguments used to advance unconditional American support for Ukrainian nationalism, and I need not repeat them here. Suffice it to say it does not matter to the US of A one way or another if Ukraine is a NATO member, but it is a vital matter to Russia. It will not be possible to improve relations with Russia without making a concession on this core issue.
However, we are not in the business of making concessions in modern American foreign policy. Ian Lustick wrote a book about the Israel-Palestinian conflict a few years back where he said that Israel's downfall may have been the fact that it was too successful in getting its way by military means since 1948, and that its string of successes led Israel's political leaders to believe that they did not have to make concessions in order to receive things back in return. This, of course, is the logic of theft rather than the logic of commerce and cooperation. And it is the same logic that Washington seems to operate under. "I want something. I don't want to give anything up in return. Someone should just give it to me or I'll threaten them."
I will give Charles Kupchan credit for at least recognizing that Russia and China moving closer economically and diplomatically just might be problematic for the US. I see little evidence that this is recognized by our current national security establishment. They seem intent on finding new ways to encourage this trend, like sending provocative naval patrols into the Black Sea and through the Taiwan Straits. Tactics without strategy seems to be their specialty.
A very fine piece. I will grant (purely for the sake of argument) that conflict with China is inevitable. I applaud the author for realizing that if conflict with China is inevitable, it would make unquestionable strategic sense to have Russia as a key member of the counter-balancing coalition. I laud him for not advocating the worst option of all: a disastrous "dual containment" strategy vis-a-vis both China and Russia simultaneously. There may be no such thing as a "natural" partner or enemy in international relations but Russia and China share an awfully long land border, and proximity tends to breed conflict. The author has a plausible objective in trying to bring Russia into the American-led counterbalancing coalition against China (albeit an objective based on the premise that conflict with China is inevitable, which I do not believe.)
The problem lies in the fact that the author seems to have failed to appreciate the most basic aspect of how to achieve that objective: in any negotiation, you have to give something up in order to get something back. When I go to buy a car, I would like the dealer to give me a new car for free. The dealer would like me to pay a million dollars for a new Kia. Neither are going to happen, and we negotiate and meet in the middle. I expect that the dealer may be willing to give some things up in the course of a negotiation, but I do not expect that he will do me any gratuitous favors. Forming a closer relationship with a foreign state is much more complex but follows the same principle: states are not in the business of doing gratuitous favors. Kupchan seems to think that Russia will side with the US in a great power conflict with a nuclear state on its border in exchange for a "change in tone." That would be about as reasonable as me expecting to buy a new car for $1,000. It ain't nothing and it's a start, but any reasonable negotiator would know that it's far below his counterpart's reservation price based simply on common sense.
Instead, we might do a better job of persuading Russia if we understood Russia's core security interests and were willing to make concessions which addressed those interests. Russia's overwhelming #1 security interest lies in keeping Georgia and Ukraine out of NATO. If we offered that concession (which would simply be in keeping with James Bakers' 1991 promise to Gorbachev that NATO would not expand "one inch to the east" of a reunified Germany) it would do wonders. Convincing Russia that we would keep this promise is another matter, and I am not sure they could be convinced that we would honor this agreement, or that a future administration wouldn't simply reverse this policy. But it would be a way to completely reverse the crash in US-Russia relations that has taken place ever since Hillary Clinton decided that Russia rather than her own lack of electoral appeal was the reason she lost to a semi-literate clown in 2016.
Frankly this wouldn't be a horrible concussion on our part either. Simply put, while Ukrainian NATO membership is a core Russian security interest, it does not matter to us in any material sense whatsoever. Readers of this blog are no doubt familiar with the flaws and hypocrisy that animate the "it's a matter of sacred principle!" arguments used to advance unconditional American support for Ukrainian nationalism, and I need not repeat them here. Suffice it to say it does not matter to the US of A one way or another if Ukraine is a NATO member, but it is a vital matter to Russia. It will not be possible to improve relations with Russia without making a concession on this core issue.
However, we are not in the business of making concessions in modern American foreign policy. Ian Lustick wrote a book about the Israel-Palestinian conflict a few years back where he said that Israel's downfall may have been the fact that it was too successful in getting its way by military means since 1948, and that its string of successes led Israel's political leaders to believe that they did not have to make concessions in order to receive things back in return. This, of course, is the logic of theft rather than the logic of commerce and cooperation. And it is the same logic that Washington seems to operate under. "I want something. I don't want to give anything up in return. Someone should just give it to me or I'll threaten them."
If that were not enough, basically all Kupchan has to offer is an unenforceable promise that the crocodile will eat Russia last.
I will give Charles Kupchan credit for at least recognizing that Russia and China moving closer economically and diplomatically just might be problematic for the US. I see little evidence that this is recognized by our current national security establishment. They seem intent on finding new ways to encourage this trend, like sending provocative naval patrols into the Black Sea and through the Taiwan Straits. Tactics without strategy seems to be their specialty.