Trump Doesn't Want to 'Go to Tehran'

He doesn’t want to do it, he isn’t going to do it, and no one seriously believes that it is even on the agenda.

Andrew Day makes a strange argument:

Strangely, the best bet for improving relations with Tehran and putting the Iran deal back together may be a return to the White House of Donald Trump, the very man who blew up the accord in 2018. To understand why, consider an old American adage.

“Only Nixon could go to China” captures a general truth about politics in a polarized democracy. Conservative politicians who pursue liberal policies, and liberal politicians who pursue conservative ones, signal that those policies really are in the national interest. Nixon’s reputation as an anti-communist liberated him to try improving relations with Red China in 1972, since voters could then infer it wasn’t some peacenik aspiration.

One of the many flaws in this analysis is the assumption that Trump might want to improve relations with Iran and that he wishes to restore the nuclear deal that he worked to destroy. Everything we know about Trump tells us that he has no interest in better relations with Iran, and everything he did as president made U.S.-Iranian relations worse. Even if Trump wanted to improve the relationship, I doubt very much that he would know how, but he has no desire to “go to Tehran” in any sense. There is also no reason to think that the Iranian government would trust anything he had to say after everything he did the last time he was in office.

The Trump administration was dominated by Iran hawks. There is every reason to believe that another Trump administration would also be heavily loaded with people that desire war, regime change, or some combination of the two. An administration with the likes of Ric Grenell at State and Mike Pompeo at Defense is not going to make rapprochement with Iran a priority. Robert O’Brien outlined a future Trump Iran policy, and it sounded exactly like Trump’s failed Iran policy in the past.

Add to all of this that Trump is a terrible negotiator who couldn’t close a mutually beneficial diplomatic agreement if his life depended on it. When he attempted to negotiate with North Korea, he completely botched it because he insisted on maximalist demands that Kim would never accept. He lacked the courage to take a real political risk to secure an agreement. Trump is comfortable sitting on the sidelines and whining about how terrible everyone else’s deals are, but he has no desire to take ownership of a diplomatic compromise that would open him up to charges of “weakness.” He prefers to tear down agreements that others have made while he claims that he could make a “better deal” without explanation.

When it comes to Iran and the nuclear deal, Trump is the chief arsonist. It is silly to expect him to put out the fire he set and then rebuild the structures he destroyed. He doesn’t want to do it, he isn’t going to do it, and no one seriously believes that it is even on the agenda. No one should believe that Trump is serious when he says that he would have made a “fair deal” with Iran. The U.S. had a deal with Iran that was extremely advantageous, and Trump tore it up for no good reason. Nothing he says about negotiating with Iran can be taken at face value.

Day cites Paul Pillar’s analysis to make his case, but it’s important to understand that Pillar wrote this piece before Biden had dropped out and he was focused on refuting hawkish arguments that Pezeshkian’s election didn’t matter. Harris is now the de facto Democratic nominee, and her National Security Advisor Phil Gordon just happens to have been one of the negotiators of the nuclear deal. What do we think is more likely? Do we think that a Harris administration advised by someone like Gordon is more open to negotiations with Iran, or do we think that the man who torched a major nonproliferation agreement out of spite is somehow going to reverse course and completely change his position? Reviving the nuclear deal may not be possible no matter who wins, but I don’t believe for a minute that Trump would even make an effort.

Day writes that “Trump thinks he already seems “tough” enough on Iran and is ready to take a more dovish approach.” I don’t think there is any evidence to support that claim. He says that “ a future President Trump would need to re-negotiate certain features of the agreement, such as the “sunset provisions” that lift some uranium enrichment restrictions after specified dates.” Why would he need to do this if he really wanted to improve relations? The obsession with a “better deal” has always been absurd, as many supporters of the agreement have explained ad nauseam. Why would Iran agree to any of this when it has refused to make additional concessions on these issues after years of renewed economic warfare? The Iranian government already made major concessions on the nuclear issue almost ten years ago, and in return for their cooperation they were treated to a campaign of collective punishment despite their full compliance with the agreement.

He continues, “If Trump managed to secure an agreement that was stronger than the one Obama got, he’d demonstrate his deal-making skills and antiwar bona fides.” And if Granny had wheels, she would be a bus. Give me a break. Trump has no deal-making skills, and he has no antiwar bona fides. It is embarrassing that anyone is still holding out hope in 2024 that he might have either. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was about as good a nonproliferation agreement as one was likely to get from Iran under the circumstances, and Trump threw it away because he loathed his predecessor. It is ridiculous to think that he would try to repair an agreement that he made a point of breaking.

According to Day, “Khamenei and Pezeshkian may prefer negotiating with Trump than with a Democrat, since a future Republican president would be less likely to undo their efforts.” Do foreign governments typically prefer to negotiate with the people that break promises and attack them? Does this make sense to anyone? The Iranian government might negotiate with another Republican administration at some point in the future if they believe it is in their interest to do so, but it strains credulity to think that they would be willing to do a deal with the man who betrayed them. Trump is one of the least trustworthy negotiating partners on the planet, so why would they take the chance?

One of the basic mistakes in Day’s analysis is the assumption that Trump is anything like an “America-First conservative” who might want to negotiate with Iran. Trump doesn’t care what Pat Buchanan said about the nuclear deal years ago because he never cared about the substance of the agreement in the first place. Destroying the nuclear deal was always a matter of dismantling Obama’s legacy. For all intents and purposes, he aligned himself with Republican hardliners that want nothing but enmity and mistrust between the U.S. and Iran. Nothing has changed since he first declared his intention to renege on the deal.

Back in 2016, some people on the right held out hope that Trump’s foreign policy would be an improvement over the status quo. I didn’t buy it then, but I could at least understand why others were willing to roll the dice. Eight years later, there is no excuse for holding out hope that Trump is anything other than the militarist and hawk that he has proven himself to be. If you want a better Iran policy, Trump is not the answer.