This Is Not the Détente You're Looking For

It is difficult to see how much would really change in practice if the U.S. adopted this version of détente with Iran.

Jon Alterman proposes a kind of détente with Iran:

When Iran’s leaders believe that there is no action they can take to blunt U.S. hostility, it encourages them to misbehave. Furthermore, if punishment is inevitable, then an increase in Iranian hostile activities carries no marginal risk. If Tehran believes that Washington is potentially willing to accommodate it, then it will be incentivized to reduce tensions. The goal should be something closer to détente than rapprochement. The more Tehran believes its conflict with Washington is existential, the more committed it will be to its own tools of deterrence.

Reducing tensions with Iran would be a welcome improvement over the last seven years of increasing hostility and repeated crises. A more accommodating policy is much likelier to yield at least some of the desired results. This has already been demonstrated during the brief thaw in U.S.-Iranian relations between 2013 and 2017. Alterman also makes some good points about the need for the U.S. to recognize the limits of its ability to influence Iran’s internal politics, and he correctly rules out regime change as a goal.

That said, it is difficult to see how much would really change in practice if the U.S. adopted this version of détente with Iran. The U.S. would still be stuck arming and supporting bad client governments in the region, and Alterman says that the U.S. would “work to help build the capabilities of friendly states in the region to respond to Iran.” It is hard to see how that is any different from current Biden administration policy.