There's Nothing 'Pragmatic' About Backing Oppressive Juntas

The path of least resistance is always the easiest one to take, but that doesn’t make it wise or defensible.

Michael Shurkin and Colin Clarke want the U.S. to keep working with West African juntas:

There are no attractive options for the West in dealing with the Sahel. If the U.S. does decide to work with undemocratic governments in the region, it will be imperative to employ available levers to encourage partner nations to be better. Admittedly, the United States’ track record in this regard is poor. But by refusing to engage at all, the U.S. will guarantee that the problem of jihadist violence in the Sahel only gets worse.

The path of least resistance is always the easiest one to take, but that doesn’t make it wise or defensible. It may be true that the juntas enjoy some popular support for now, but that shouldn’t determine Washington’s response. There is often some initial popular enthusiasm for military coups because the ousted government really was corrupt, abusive, or unresponsive, but that enthusiasm will tend to fade as the junta presides over a system that is every bit as bad as the old one. It might be true that the juntas will turn to other patrons in the absence of U.S. backing, but while that is regrettable it is not a good reason for the U.S. to cast aside its own obligations. If the “blueprint for fighting insurgencies in those countries has been to ratchet up state violence,” why should the U.S. further implicate itself in that?

If the U.S. won’t draw a line when there is a military coup against an elected government, it has already signaled that it won’t draw a line for anything else.