The Soleimani Assassination Really Was Stupid and Reckless
The Soleimani assassination is one of the chief examples of stupid, hardline presidential decision-making. It is a cautionary tale of what presidents should never do.
Jeffrey Friedman wrote a somewhat interesting essay on how voters judge hawkish posturing from political leaders, but this section is nonsense:
Trump’s decision to assassinate Iranian General Qasem Soleimani in January 2020 provides a good example of how it is hard to evaluate a policy’s wisdom [bold mine-DL]—but simple to spot resolve. After Trump ordered the strike, many observers accused him of recklessly risking war with Tehran. Others said that the United States should have targeted Soleimani long ago and that the strike would help deter Iran from challenging the United States in the future. Even in retrospect, it is difficult to determine whether Trump’s decision reflected good judgment [bold mine-DL]. Iran’s retaliation for the Soleimani strike was less severe than many people predicted. It is thus possible that Trump carefully analyzed the situation [bold mine-DL] and accurately understood that his choice to kill Soleimani was not as dangerous as critics claimed. But it is also possible that Trump had no idea how Tehran would react and nonetheless opted to roll the dice without good reason—and happily lucked out.
There are few Trump decisions that have been been easier to judge as reckless and unnecessary than the decision to kill Soleimani. By all accounts, Trump ordered the assassination because it was the most aggressive option he was given, and because he was responding to pressure from Senate Republicans whose support he needed at his first impeachment trial. That is based on numerous reports that came out at the time and in the subsequent weeks and months. Alice Friend, Mara Karlin and Loren DeJonge Schulman wrote about the decision a couple weeks after it happened:
According to multiple news reports, policymakers gave Trump the option of killing Qasem Soleimani as one of several choices, perhaps hoping that including such a dramatic measure would push him toward a middle course; instead, he went for it, reportedly with little forethought or preparation [bold mine-DL].
The Iranian response may have been limited, but it was the first time that Iranian forces in Iran directly launched attacks on U.S. troops. Over a hundred Americans suffered traumatic brain injuries, some of which were quite severe and debilitating. It was dumb luck that no one died and that there was no pressure for further escalation. The record shows that Trump jumped at the assassination option when it was presented to him. This isn’t something we have to guess about, so it is bizarre that Friedman writes about it as if we don’t know the answer. Only one of the two possibilities that Friedman considers here is true.
We know that Trump never carefully analyzed anything, but had a record of impulsive, bad decisions. The administration first lied about the strike and claimed that it was intended to preempt an imminent attack, and then pretended that it was intended to “restore deterrence.” There was no imminent attack in the works, and killing Soleimani did nothing to reduce the frequency of militia attacks on bases housing U.S. troops. The truth was that Trump felt like ordering an illegal assassination and did it regardless of the immediate and long-term consequences. It is easy to see that this was a terrible decision made for the wrong reasons, and U.S. troops in Iraq and Syria are still living with the results years later.
Killing Soleimani and an Iraqi militia leader didn’t prevent further attacks on U.S. troops in Iraq and Syria. If anything, it gave the IRGC and militias in Iraq and Syria added incentive to launch more attacks. It brought the U.S. and Iran dangerously close to a direct conflict, and it is possible that there will be further Iranian retaliation for that assassination sometime in the future. The fact that the crisis didn’t lead to a larger war was a matter of luck and depended on Iranian restraint in response to an act of war committed against them. The Soleimani assassination is one of the chief examples of stupid, hardline presidential decision-making. It is a cautionary tale of what presidents should never do, and it is a useful reminder of why Trump himself should never be trusted with so much power ever again.
Friedman’s article is also dumb because of how shortsighted it is. He doesn’t examine the long-term consequences of the assassination. The assassination strengthened hardliners and provided evidence that the U.S. could never be trusted and bore aggressive intentions towards Iran. It also (predictably) caused Iran to move closer to China and Russia and to shore up its ties with its own proxies and allies in the ME.
It makes no sense to examine only the immediate, hyper-short-term consequences of the assassination, especially now that several years have passed since it happened. This is one of the problems of our political and media class: they can’t think in longer term timelines because they’re glued to the short-term news cycle.
Sometimes, I think COVID may have saved us from WW3 due to the assassination consequences.