The Limits of U.S.-India Partnership

India is never going to be what China hawks want it to be because India has no reason to play the part they have created for it

Ashley Tellis makes a strong case that the U.S. expects far too much from its relationship with India:

The fundamental problem is that the United States and India have divergent ambitions for their security partnership. As it has done with allies across the globe, Washington has sought to strengthen India’s standing within the liberal international order and, when necessary, solicit its contributions toward coalition defense. Yet New Delhi sees things differently. It does not harbor any innate allegiance toward preserving the liberal international order and retains an enduring aversion toward participating in mutual defense. It seeks to acquire advanced technologies from the United States to bolster its own economic and military capabilities and thus facilitate its rise as a great power capable of balancing China independently, but it does not presume that American assistance imposes any further obligations on itself.

The key point here is that India is not a U.S. ally and therefore doesn’t behave like one, but Washington wants to imagine that it is or that it could be one in an anti-China coalition. The U.S.-India relationship is much closer than it once was, and it can be a constructive one sometimes, but it is never going to be what China hawks want it to be because India has no reason to play the part they have created for it. For one thing, India has its own interests, and those interests aren’t best served by becoming part of a containment policy that exposes them to greater risk in exchange for no additional benefits. Like many other states in Asia, India is not interested in being a front-line state in a U.S.-China rivalry.