The Insanity of the Regime Changers

If the only way to “win” is regime change in two countries, that tells us that winning is not a realistic goal.

Garry Kasparov calls for more regime changes in The Wall Street Journal:

A war can’t be won by following the rules set in peacetime. The only way to win this long war is through regime change in Moscow and Tehran. Such change will be brought closer by isolating Russia and Iran politically and economically and by halting their foreign aggression.

Kasparov’s argument is deranged, but it is useful in reminding us how extreme and dangerous this worldview is. If hardliners like Kasparov had their way, they would unleash chaos and instability unlike anything most of us have seen in our lifetimes. The same people that want to set the world on fire are constantly warning us that if we don’t do what they want that we face “a global catastrophe the likes of which we have never seen,” but it is clear that they are the ones demanding that the U.S. initiate such a catastrophe with overly aggressive policies.

If the only way to “win” is regime change in two countries, that tells us that winning is not a realistic goal. Kasparov seems to think that setting a goal, no matter how unhinged or far-fetched, is all that matters. Is the goal achievable at a reasonable cost? He doesn’t care about that. He writes, “Supporting Ukraine until it is whole and free is a goal. Promoting long-term peace in Europe and the Middle East by doing everything possible to accelerate the downfall of hostile regimes in Russia and Iran is a goal.” It’s true that these are goals in the same way that saying you want to fly to the moon is a goal.

The surest way to destroy international support for Ukraine is to adopt an insane, maximalist goal of regime change in Russia. Many governments are willing to back a policy aimed at defending against an aggressor, but they are not going to support one that threatens to destabilize a large part of Eurasia and potentially risk significant escalation from Moscow. Seeking to topple both governments is also a good way to encourage the Russian government to increase its threats of using nuclear weapons and to push the Iranian government into pursuing their own nuclear arsenal. The worst thing that the U.S. could do is convince these governments that they are in a fight for their survival.

Regime change is almost never the right answer. When it “works” and the targeted regime is toppled, it typically creates many more problem and dangers than it eliminates. When it fails and backfires, it leads to even greater hostility and it could lead to direct conflict. We know that setting regime change as an official goal can pave the way for war later when other means fail to bring down the government. The U.S. should not seek war with Russia or Iran, and so it should not adopt a policy that makes that war much more likely.

Pursuing regime change in Russia and Iran would likely end in failure, and it would give the targeted governments strong incentives to intensify their security cooperation and to lash out against those that seek to bring about their collapse. Even if it “worked” and different leaders took power, there is no reason to expect that the successor governments would be more cooperative than the current ones. Regime change is a terrible policy goal promoted by ideologues and warmongers, and the U.S. should reject it as an option.