The Endless Allied Need for Reassurance

How long before that full confidence wanes again and President Yoon or one of his successors starts floating the idea of acquiring their own arsenal?

Adam Mount and Toby Dalton comment on the new Washington Declaration and U.S. nuclear assurances to South Korea:

However, nuclear assurance never actually seems to assure South Koreans but only leads to more and more demands for nuclear assurance [bold mine-DL]. U.S. officials say it feels like pouring water into a bucket with a hole in the bottom. Already, some South Korean experts are saying that, even though the Washington Declaration delivers what they had asked for, it won’t be enough to satisfy the bargainers or the zealots.

The declaration text says that the South Korean government has “full confidence in U.S. extended deterrence commitments,” but if that were true there would be no perceived need to make the statement. How long before that full confidence wanes again and President Yoon or one of his successors starts floating the idea of acquiring their own arsenal? How many more times does the U.S. have to refill the bucket?