The 'Better Deal' with Iran Is Still a Fantasy
It is a mistake to assume that the Iranian government will be open to making even larger concessions than they did ten years ago.
Philip Gordon must be kidding:
Trump has signaled his own interest in a deal, and the new strategic landscape could lead Iran to put far more on the table than previously imagined. Concessions that were never realistic in the past but might be today [bold mine-DL] include strict caps on levels of nuclear enrichment, conditions without expiration dates, limits on ballistic missiles, and even limits on Iranian regional interference (since Iran’s proxies have been so weakened anyway). A new deal could even prevent a domestic Iranian uranium-enrichment program by allowing Iran to access an international fuel bank; such a setup would allow Tehran to claim to have preserved its right to benefit from civil nuclear-energy production and also permit Trump and the Israeli government to say that they denied Iran control over enrichment.
It is a mistake to assume that the Iranian government will be open to making even larger concessions than they did ten years ago. If anything, Iran’s weakened position in the region will make them drive a harder bargain on the nuclear issue than they did last time. Even if Iran had not suffered significant setbacks over the last year, the Iranian government would have every incentive to insist on fewer restrictions on its nuclear program after the U.S. reneged on the last deal abruptly and without any good reason. At this point, getting Iran to accept an exact replica of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) would be a challenge. The imaginary “better” deal remains just as unrealistic as ever.