Strategic Ambiguity Still Works, So There Is No Need to Replace It

So-called strategic clarity is a solution in search of a problem.

Joseph Bosco wants to get rid of a policy that has worked very well for more than forty years:

The time for word games and rhetorical posturing is over — Washington must end its policy of strategic ambiguity on defending Taiwan. More than the provision of particular weapons systems, a clear official statement of US intention to defend Taiwan will both deter Chinese aggression, and assuage corporate and governmental concerns.

So-called strategic clarity is a solution in search of a problem. The U.S. has not made an explicit security commitment to defend Taiwan since it terminated the mutual defense treaty in 1979, and there has been no war in the meantime. Strategic ambiguity has helped to keep the peace in Asia, and there is no good reason to scrap something that is still working. Strategic clarity would also lock the U.S. into fighting a major war that is unrelated to vital U.S. interests.

Making an explicit commitment to defend Taiwan would be a major change in U.S. policy that is sure to provoke the Chinese government. Far from deterring an attack, it would act as a goad and could very well precipitate the war that it is supposed to be preventing. Relations between the U.S. and China are already as bad as they have been at any point since normalization. This is a terrible time to start experimenting with throwing a proven stabilizing policy in the trash. Abandoning strategic ambiguity would confirm the Chinese government’s worst fears about U.S. intentions and put significant pressure on the Chinese leadership to lash out in response. Taiwan would be exposed to greater danger in exchange for no discernible gains.

Even if it didn’t immediately trigger an attack, an explicit U.S. security commitment would invite challenge and we can be sure that the Chinese government would resort to coercive and intimidating measures short of war. Taiwan would be subjected to increased economic coercion and Chinese military exercises would be intensified. This would hardly assuage the concerns of skittish investors, who would then have even more reasons to want to take their business elsewhere.

Dropping strategic ambiguity not only needlessly gambles with Taiwan’s security, but it would also be an extremely risky commitment that isn’t necessary for U.S. and allied security. The increased risks of this course are obvious, and the benefits are nowhere to be seen. An explicit declaration from the United States that it would fight to defend Taiwan would not lessen tensions between China and Taiwan, nor would it improve relations between the U.S. and China. It is practically guaranteed to make both worse and it would make conflict harder to avoid.

As Michael Swaine explained in a recent interview with John Glaser, responsibly managing tensions over Taiwan also requires reassuring the Chinese government. There would be no way to reassure Beijing about U.S. intentions if the U.S. makes an explicit security commitment to Taiwan. Without that reassurance, it becomes much harder to preserve the peace.

The U.S. should not make policy changes that are likely to destabilize East Asia. Strategic clarity is right at the top of the list of changes that would have significant destabilizing effects. If the U.S. made this change, it would amount to lighting a match and throwing it on a powder keg.