No One Has a '50-Year Plan'

If you pause to ask why China is supposed to be the “ultimate long-term planner,” the answer is likely to be some mish-mash of Orientalism and authoritarian envy.

James Stavridis trots out a tired idea:

It is hard work, believe me. We did high fives when we managed to construct a short, five-year plan for defense spending, and that was before we needed to incorporate the threat of China as a true rival. Meanwhile, my opposite number in the People’s Liberation Army, under the watchful eye of the Chinese Communist Party, was methodically, deliberately and efficiently building at least a 50-year plan, if not something that looked a century into the future [bold mine-DL]. China is the ultimate long-term planner, and we’ve never been able to replicate that in Washington.

There is a tendency in foreign policy debates to attribute strengths and capabilities to potential or real adversaries that the observer believes that our side lacks. This has the (usually intended) effect of exaggerating the threat from the adversary while also setting up the adversary’s supposed strength as a model to emulate. When it comes to China, there is also the tendency to attribute extraordinary foresight and long-term thinking to the other government because of old stereotypes. This is where we get nonsense like a “50-year plan” and how their leaders supposedly “think in terms of centuries.” If you pause to ask why China is supposed to be the “ultimate long-term planner,” the answer is likely to be some mish-mash of Orientalism and authoritarian envy.